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En este trabajo se realizará una exposición del primer Teorema de Gödel. En esta 
exposición se detallará los preliminares necesarios para entender el teorema y se dará una 
prueba accesible y teórica más que técnica de cómo funciona la argumentación de Gödel del 








In this work we are going to present Goidels First Theorem In this presentation we are going 
to present the necessary preliminaries for understanding Goidels first theorem and we are 
going to present a theoretical and accessible proof of how the theorem works, more than a 
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To understand Gödel’s theorems, we need to make clear or understand first a little bit of 
philosophy of mathematics and the historical concept of the problem. Gödel’s theorems are in 
a sense a response to the Principia Mathematica of Bertrand Russel. Most importantly it is a 
response to the idea of trying to axiomatize all of mathematics by David Hilbert. An axiom is 
a statement that you accept as true without needing a proof. Besides axioms you have rules of 
inference. These are rules that tell you where you can go. For example a rule of inference 
may say that if you have the key A you have to open the door A. So if you have the key A 
then the door A is opened by you. Rules of inference in a sense are the rules that dictate 
where you can go from point A. The initial points are obviously the axioms. The combination 
of inference rules starting from axioms will be the theorems of the system, since you can 
prove that you can get to the theorem from the axioms if you follow the rules of inference. 
This example will be really helpful to understand this 
Axioms 
P,O,I 
Rules of inference 
1. If you have P then you can have PI 
2. If you have X, X being any string of this symbols then you can have XOX 
3. If you have IO you can have P 
So for example let us start with the initial axiom P. 
Since we have P by rule 1 we can have PI 




By rule 3 we can have PPPI 
Another example 
Let us start with axiom I 
By inference rule 2 we can have IOI 
By inference rule 3 we can have PI 
In this example you can clearly see that our axioms are the three initial letters and the strings 
that we can derive through our inference rules are the theorems of the system. This is a basic 
example of what a formal system looks like. 
Through history mathematics has work in this sense. For example, Euclidian geometry 
behaves in this way. There are 5 axioms in Euclidian geometry. From these five axioms you 
can derive theorems of geometry. For example, the Pythagorean Theorem is a combination of 
these axioms through rules of inference. Sadly, not in all systems the rules of inference have 
been explicit like in our little example system. Sometimes the rules of inference are human 
intuition and human logical sense. Mathematics hasn’t always been formalized so that the 
rules of inference and axioms are explicit in the system. 
During the 20th century one of the goals of mathematicians was to formalize mathematics, 
specially the mathematics that is concerned with properties of natural numbers. The objective 
of this was to have a finite number of axioms and explicit rules of inference, and once you 
define these ones, to prove that you can derive all theorems of the system. A theorem will be 
a true statement of the system. So, if we can derive all theorems we can derive all true 
statements of the system That way when a mathematical problem appears and someone wants 
to prove it, he can be sure that through a particular axiomatization and rules the theorem 
could be proven. Analogous to our example, theorems will be strings and we can get to any 




Since mathematics is expressed through symbols, we can easily assign a finite number of 
symbols to characterize the mathematical system. Sort of like a language with letters and 
punctuation symbols we can create infinitely many expressions that have meaning, we can 
create a mathematical alphabet for our system to create the mathematical expressions. That 
way a formal system will look alike our example but more complex. During this paper we 
won’t explicitly do this but we will theoretically use this idea to prove Gödel’s theorem. 
An important aspect of Gödel’s theorem is in the computational sense. A computer has 
programs that are algorithms that go from point A to point B through rules of language, 
analogous to our rules of inference. In that case we can find algorithms for all theorems and 
we can in a sense computerize mathematics. 
Sadly, this project crumbled down when Gödel proved that in a formal system there are 
expressions or strings that are true but that can’t be proven. This means that there are 
expressions that are true but can’t be derive through rules of inference from the axioms. 
We are going to try to understand his main idea in a more didactic way before going to the 
actual proof. 
The main idea behind Gödel theorem is when the system is self-referential. For example, if I 
say “X always lies” and I replace X with any other person other than myself, for example 
X=Jorge. Then that sentence can either be true or false. But if I replaced X with the subject 
“I”. Then we have the sentence “I always lie”. Which if it is true that I always lie then I will 
be saying a truth which contradicts the statement. And if it was a lie than I will always tell the 
truth but right now I am telling a lie. So, we have a paradox. So, when a system becomes self-
referential then we have these types of sentences that are neither true nor false. 
Of course, in mathematics formulas often talk about numbers similar to when in language one 




statement refer to itself and that way construct the paradox of language in a mathematical 
sense. 
History  
During the 20th century one of Hilbert’s goal was to axiomatize all of mathematics. Gödel 
heard about Hilbert’s project through his thesis Professor who encouraged him to dedicate 
himself to this problem. In 1930 Gödel solved two important results. The first one being that 
there are true statements in a formal system that are not provable. This statement later 
became that a system is incomplete. This theorem is known as the first incomplete theorem. 
The second problem he solved was that a formal system cannot determine its own 
consistency. This is Goidels second theorem and one of Hilbert’s 23 problems. 
Gödel’s first exposition of his theorem was given in Konigsberg. His lecture was about the 
incompleteness of the Principia Mathematica a famous book by mathematician Bertrand 
Russell. His lecture didn’t produce any controversy in the public. His results were not clearly 
understood by the people. There was one famous mathematician Jon Von Neuman who 
understood the gravity of the results and later popularized them. It is said that Hilbert was 
deeply frustrated with Gödel’s results. His results are controversial in the mathematical 
world. People who are experts on them say we still don’t grasp the gravity of his results 
The following phrase was said in the lecture and it summarizes the lecture itself 
“Assuming the consistency of classical mathematical systems one can give examples of 
prepositions that, while contentually true, are unprovable in the formal system of classical 
mathematics.” 
Gödel later proved that the continuum hypothesis is true but not provable in the Zemelo-
Fraenkel(ZF) axiomatic system. The ZF system was an axiomatic system to represent all of 




Gödel scape WW2 by receiving a US visa. He taught in Princeton. He died in 1978. He 
suffered mentally and physically his last ten years. He suffered depression and paranoia to the 









Since Gödel’s theorems deals with formal systems we have to define what are the 
characteristics of a formal system. The way we are going to define a formal system for this 
proof is to assimilate it to a language L. Our language has a way of representing natural 
numbers and infinitely many variables with finite characters. For example, let us suppose C 
stands for 0 then C’ stands for 1 and so on. Also, with variables suppose we have two 
variables in a sentence then V with be the first variable and V’ the second and so on.  So, we 
are going to have a language composed of finite letters or characters. Since we have finite 
characters the number of combinations we can make with these characters is countable. Since 
for expressions that only have one letter we have the number of expressions equal to the 
number of characters. For expressions of two letters we also have finite expressions, and so 
on. So, we have countable expressions for our system L. That will be our first set. The set E 
of expressions, and here is the structure of a formal system. 
Structuring of a Formal Language 
1. Set E of Expressions 
2. The second set is a subset of E called S that are the sentences of E. (In a particular 
system a sentence is a combination of characters that don’t violate the rules or intern 
logic of the system. Is like in a language it is a combination of symbols that is 
syntactically correct. For example, in a language you can say the sky is green without 
being true. But you can’t say green sky is the because it has no logic. Our formal 
system will also have a logic that explicitly sates the rules of arrangement. Every 




3. The third subset is a subset of S called the provable sentences P (Sentences that we 
can derive through the rules of the system from the axioms) 
4. The fourth is the subset of S called R that are the refutable sentences (Sentences that 
their negation is a provable sentence) 
5. A subset of expressions called predicates H of L (A predicate is an expression that has 
a variable that can be replaced by a natural number, when it is replaced we have a 
sentence) 
6. The last subset will be the subset T that will be a subset of S called the true sentences 
of L. The definition of truth for a sentence will depend on the rules of logic of the 
particular system. For this abstract scheme we only point out the existence of 
sentences that are true. Note that Ture is not the same as provable.  Provable 
statement is that through a deductive system with the axioms and the rules of 
inference we can arrive to the statement. A true sentence for example is one that once 
we define what means for a system to be truth it then fulfills the definition. But this 
definition doesn’t come from the system itself it comes from another system, a meta 
system that defines what it means for a sentence to be true in the system we are 
working. This is the relationship object language (language we are working) and meta 
language (language that describes the object language). This is Tarski’s theory of 
truth in a nutshell. I am not going to prove or go into further detail. But even Gödel 
proved that arithmetic truth can’t be defined from arithmetic itself. Just clarify this so 
the reader can understand that the notion of truth is different from the notion of 
provable.  
Another way of thinking about it, is to think of true sentences as the truths of 
mathematics that live in the platonic realm of the world of truths of mathematics. We 




reached finitely many truths with formal systems doesn’t mean that we can reach to 
all of these platonic truths in the platonic truth world.  
 What mathematicians before Gödel wanted to proof is the all True sentences are 
provable and all provable sentences are true. Mainly mathematicians wanted to prove 
we can arrive to the platonic truth world. So, they have to be different sets as an initial 
assumption and then we need to proof they are the same. But Gödel found that this 
was not the case. 
7. Lastly, we have a function α that associates each Expression with a natural number 
creating the expression E(n). If the expression is a predicate we have a sentence. Also, 
we have sentences without variables so if that is the case E(n)=E for all n. But if a 
variable is in there then we have a different expression for each E(n) and this is 
specially the case for predicates. Note that we have countable many predicates and 
countable many integers. From set theory we know that NxN is also countable so we 
still have countable expressions of the form E(n) 
If you note our system besides having these 7 subsets it also needs to have some other 
properties. For example, it needs to be referring to natural numbers. It needs to have the 
negation operator in the language. Also, for the notion of truth it needs the equal and less than 
or equal operator. These will be clearer as we go through but it is just a clarification for right 
now. 
This is the structure of what a formal system looks like form an abstract way. 
We are going to observe some definitions that will help us in the process. Also, every set that 






Set A is said to be expressed by a predicate H if H(n) is true for all n in A and false for all n 
not in   A. So we have 
𝐻(𝑛) ∈ 𝑇 ↔ 𝑛 ∈ 𝐴 
Expressablility: a set A is expressible in the language L if A is expressed by some predicate 
of L. 
Correct system 
A system is said to be correct if every provable sentences of L are true and all refutable 
sentences are false. So, P is a subset of T and T and R are disjoint. We can only arrive to true 
sentences. The sentences we can’t arrive are refutable sentences and we can proof they are 
refutable by arriving to their negation Note that a true sentence and provable sentence are not 
strictly the same. Later this distinction will become clearer 
Gödel Numbering 
Since we have countable many expressions we can have a 1 to 1 function from the 
expressions to the natural numbers. This number will be the Gödel number of the Expression. 
Note that if we have a predicate H that predicate has a Gödel number and the Gödel number 
of that predicate is different from the Gödel number of the specific sentence H(n). One thing 
is a predicate with a variable that has its own Gödel number and another different is the 
sentence H(n). They are both different expressions. The following chart will explain this 
more graphically.  
Supposed we have all predicates. Since there are countable expressions there are countable 




values from least to greater according to their Gödel number. The Gödel number of predicate 
Hgi is gi. Then we make a table.  
 g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 g7 g8 g9 
Hg1(n) Hg1(g1) Hg1(g2) Hg1(g3) Hg1(g4) Hg1(g5) Hg1(g6) Hg1(g7) Hg1(g8) Hg1(g9) 
Hg2(n) Hg2(g1) Hg2(g2) Hg2(g3) Hg2(g4) Hg2(g5) Hg2(g6) Hg2(g7) Hg2(8g) Hg2(g9) 
Hg3(n) Hg3(g1) Hg3(g2) Hg3(g3) Hg3(g4) Hg3(g5) Hg3(g6) Hg3(g7) Hg3(g8) Hg3(g9) 
Hg4(n) Hg4(g1) Hg4(g2) Hg4(g3) Hg4(g4) Hg4(g5) Hg4(g6) Hg4(g7) Hg4(g8) Hg4(g9) 
Hg5(n) Hg5(g1) Hg5(g2) Hg5(g3) Hg5(g4) Hg5(g5) Hg5(g6) Hg5(g7) Hg5(g8) Hg5(g9) 
 
 
Obviously, this table goes to infinity down and to the right. Where gi represents the Gödel 
number of the predicate and then we evaluate each predicate. But the Gödel number of Hgi as 
a predicate is different form Hgi(n) for all n. 
Note that in statements without variables (sentences) the Gödel number is always the same, 
and this table can’t be made since this table is for predicates 
What we are interested in this table is what happens to expressions of the form Hgi(gi). This is 
called the diagonalization of Hgi. This sentence will be true if and only if the sentence 
expresses the Gödel number of the predicate itself. 
Note that doing this is like talking about ourselves. We associate each predicate with a 
number and then that predicate talks about the number is associated. Is like saying something 





Let us define diagonalization more formally. The diagonalization of an expression Hgi is the 
expression Hgi(gi). If the expression is not a predicate then the diagonalization is the same 
expression. But we are mainly interested in predicates 
We call the function d(n) the diagonal function of the system. Which takes any natural 
number 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 and makes it the Gödel number of Hn(n). It is a function from the naturals to 
the naturals. That in other words is sending the Gödel number of the predicate Hn to the 
Gödel number of the diagonalization of Hn(n).  It actually takes the Gödel number of any 
expression even if it is not a predicate. But since the diagonalization of a non-predicate 
expression is itself then d() of a non-predicate Gödel number is the same Gödel number. But 
we are only interested in predicates. We can forget about non-predicates. 











As you can see it is sending the Gödel number of each predicate to the diagonal. That is why 
it is the diagonal function. 
 
 
Set of Gödel 
numbers of 
predicates Hn where 
n is the Gödel 
number of each 
predicates 
Gödel’s numbers of 







 g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 g7 g8 g9 
Hg1(n) Hg1(g1) Hg1(g2) Hg1(g3) Hg1(g4) Hg1(g5) Hg1(g6) Hg1(g7) Hg1(g8) Hg1(g9) 
Hg2(n) Hg2(g1) Hg2(g2) Hg2(g3) Hg2(g4) Hg2(g5) Hg2(g6) Hg2(g7) Hg2(8g) Hg2(g9) 
Hg3(n) Hg3(g1) Hg3(g2) Hg3(g3) Hg3(g4) Hg3(g5) Hg3(g6) Hg3(g7) Hg3(g8) Hg3(g9) 
Hg4(n) Hg4(g1) Hg4(g2) Hg4(g3) Hg4(g4) Hg4(g5) Hg4(g6) Hg4(g7) Hg4(g8) Hg4(g9) 








Now we are going to define two sets in the natural numbers A and A* such that for every 
natural number n, d(n)A and nA*. In other words, d-1(A) is A*. Note that we are defining 
A* in terms of A and not the other way around. But since the diagonal function is one to one 
then the following relationship still hold 
𝑛 ∈ 𝐴 ∗↔ 𝑑(𝑛) ∈ 𝐴 
We can also say that this relationship is between the Gödel numbers in the diagonal and the 
Gödel numbers of the predicate. 
Now we are ready to use all of these definitions and start proving Gödel’s First Theorem. 




aspect of this first sketch of the proof is that we are going to make some assumptions. With 
the definitions we have and the assumptions we are going to make it will be enough to proof 
the theorem and start seeing the general idea behind Gödel’s thinking. After this proof we are 
going to proof the assumptions in a more technical way. After proving the assumptions that 
we are going to use right now we will understand that these assumptions are actually 
necessary condition for the type of formal systems to which Gödel’s first theorem applies. 
Assumptions 
A1 For any set A expressible in L, the set A* is expressible in L 
A2 For any set A expressible in L, the set ?̅? is expressible in L. By ?̅? we mean the 
complement of A 
A3 The set P is expressible in L. Where P is the set of Gödel numbers of all provable 
sentences. 
We are going to see later that Assumptions one and two are actually hinted at the phrasing of 
the formal expression of Gödel’s First theorem 
But first we need some definitions to get the idea of the statement of Goidels first theorem 
Definitions 
Consistency 
A system L is said to be consistent if no sentence is provable or derivable and refutable or not 
derivable at the same time. It is called inconsistent if a sentence is provable and refutable at 
the same time.  
Note that a correct system is consistent since T and R are disjoint and P is a subset of T. So, 








To define completeness, we first need to define decidability. A sentence X is decidable if it is 
provable or refutable. A system is complete if all sentences in the system are decidable. Note 
provable and refutable is not the same as true and false 
Now we can state the theorem 
 
"Any consistent formal system F within which a certain amount of elementary arithmetic can 
be carried out is incomplete; i.e., there are statements of the language of F which can neither 
be proved nor disproved in F." (Raatikainen 2015) 
Assumption two is implicit in consistent formal system. And Assumption 1 and 3 are 
implicit in certain amount of elementary arithmetic. But we will see this when we proof 




The proof we are formulating is not the original one made by Gödel. It is a later proof with 
concepts of Tarsky. Having said that let us continue with our proof. 
Since P is expressible in our correct system L then by our two assumptions.?̃?* is expressible 
in L. By assumption 2 P complement is expressible in L. By Assumption 1 applied to P 
complement ?̃?* is expressible in A. So, we have that ?̃?*   is expressible in our correct system 
L. 
Let H a predicate that expresses ?̃?* in our correct system L. Let h be the Gödel number of this 




happens to the diagonalization of our predicate H, H(h). H(h)  𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 ℎ ∈ ?̃?*. 
But 
ℎ ∈ ?̃? ∗↔ d(h) ∈ ?̃? ↔ d(h) ∉ P 
This means that H(h) is true if and only if the diagonalization of d(h) is not in P. This will 
mean that H(h) is true but since its Gödel number is not in P then H(h) is not a provable 
sentence. That will mean that there are true sentences that are not probable or derivable. 
Just to avoid this let us then suppose H(h) is false. Then that will mean that d(h)∈P. Then this 
will mean that H(h) is false and derivable. This is against the definition of a correct system. 
So we can’t have this either 
So, what we can have at the end is that H(h) is true but not derivable. Which means that there 
exist true sentences that can’t be proven in our system. 
We have proven Gödel’s first theorem that there are true sentences that can’t be proven so 
our correct system is incomplete because these statements are true and can’t be proven and T 
and R are disjoint so these statements are undecidable. 
We still need to proof our 3 Assumptions and we need to clarify the notion of truth a little bit. 
This will be done later in a technical way using examples of how to do it for a particular 
formal system.  
To continue we are going to proof that there are true sentences that are not provable in a 
different way. For this we are going to introduce the concept of Gödel Sentence 
 
Gödel Sentence 
A sentence En is a Gödel sentence for the set A if either, En is a true sentence and n (The 
Gödel number of the sentence) is in A. Or if it is false then Gödel number is not in A. With 




Diagonal Lemma: For any set A, if A* is expressible in L the there is a Gödel sentence for 
A. Since L satisfies condition or Assumption 1, A1, then there is a Gödel sentence for every 
expressible set A. 
Proof Of Lemma 
Let H a predicate that expresses A* in our correct system L. Let h be the Gödel number of 
this predicate H so d(h) is the Gödel number of H(h). Since H expresses A* then 
H(h)  𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 ℎ ∈ 𝐴*. Then 
ℎ ∈ 𝐴 ∗↔ d(h) ∈ 𝐴 
So, H(h) is true if and only if its Gödel number belongs to A. Or it is false if and only if its 
Gödel number doesn’t belong to A. So, H(h) is a Gödel sentence by definition.  
Now let us proof again that there exists true sentences that are not provable with the notion of 
a Gödel Sentence. 
 
Second Proof of Gödel’s Theorem 
By our three assumptions ?̃?* is expressible in L. This means that there is a Gödel sentence for 
?̃? by the Diagonal Lemma. This will mean that the Gödel sentence for ?̃? is true if and only if 
its Gödel number is not in P. So, the Gödel sentence number will not be in the set of provable 
sentences of L so it is true and not probable. Or it is false and its Gödel number belongs to P 
and then we have an incorrect system. We have proven again that there are true sentences that 
can’t be proven. 
The notion of Gödel sentences will also help us talk a little bit about the set T of true 
sentences of L. 
True Sentences properties 




Now we have the following three theorems. 
1. The set ?̃?* is not expressible in L 
2. Since ?̃?* is not expressible in L. The set ?̃? can’t be expressible in L because of A1. So, 
if the condition holds it will violate theorem 1 
3. Since ?̃? is not expressible in L then T can’t be expressible in L by A2. So, if the 
condition holds it will violate theorem 2 
So, we only need to proof the first theorem and the other two will be proven thanks to the 
conditions that we assume. 
Proof 
If ?̃?* is expressible in L, then there is a Gödel sentence for ?̃?. This cannot be the case since 
that will mean that if the Gödel sentence is false its Gödel number belong to T and this is 
absurd. Also, if it is true then its Gödel number doesn’t belong to the set T, which is also 
absurd. 
So, we have finally that ?̃?*,?̃? and T are not expressible in L 
Note that P is expressible in the system by Assumption 3. So, we can see once again that T 
and P are not the same since T is not expressible and P is. 
As you can see our proof is for correct systems. But since correctness implies consistency we 
can be sure our system is consistent.  
Summary 
We have used the technique of Gödel numbering to keep track of sentences. The type of 
sentences that we are interested in are diagonal sentences. These sentences have an 
interesting property that in a sense they are talking about themselves. Also, when the system 
follows our three assumptions that we made the first two being conditions of a formal system, 




have found undecidable sentences that are perfectly well formed just by assuming that the set 
P is expressible and then following A1 and A2. We still need to proof these three assumptions 
and that is what we are going to do right now in a more technical and particular way. But first 
we need some preliminaries. 
Preliminaries. 
The first preliminary is to understand that in a more specific language we don’t have 
expressions we have formulas. Our symbols represent mathematical relationships such as = 
or less than or equal etc. A formula is a statement that is syntactically correct in the system 
and that it expresses one of the two relationships ≤ or =. To create a specific system for this 
paper is not necessary since we are only interested in the proof in general but we need to 
understand how a formal mathematical language will behave to get the idea.  
To represent numbers and variables we need also a symbolic system. Even though to 
represent numbers we already have finite symbols we can make it with fewer symbols. For 
example, we can have 0 as itself and 0´ as one and 0´´ as two and that way we have all the 
natural numbers with only two symbols. 
Now we are ready to introduce the concept of formulas and sentences in a more particular 
system. Note that a formula will be the same as a predicate in the abstract proof that we did 
and a sentence will be a formula that is already replace with a natural number or natural 
numbers that the formula needs. Let us imagine that our formulas have the structure of  
2𝑥 + 3𝑦 = 5 
So the formula will have two variables F(x,y). To represent the first variable we can use a 
character like v and to represent the other ones we can have v´,v´´,v´´´ etc. Like in our more 
abstract example sentences have syntactical restrictions also formulas have them. Mainly a 





Lastly an important condition of the more particular system is to have characters for the 
elementary arithmetic operations +, * and exponentiation. And logical operator not~ 
Notion of truth in the particular system 
As we already said the notion of truth depends on the system. But here we are going to make 
a little acclamation that will help us differentiate between provable and true. In a correct 
system every provable statement is true as a definition. But we haven’t quite defined what it 
takes for a sentence to be true we only mention that True and provable are not the same. It is 
easier to explain this in a more particular mathematical system. Truth statements are 
statements that once defined the “=” and “≤” relationship, these relationships are true. This is 
why the notion of truth is related with sets of numbers. Because these relationships in a 
predicate are true depending on the set of numbers that make them true. So even if a 
predicate describes a relationship that is true for a set of numbers, that doesn’t mean that from 
the axioms we can prove it. This was just a clarification to understand better the notion of 
truth that is easier to understand in a particular example. 
Note that the notion of truth doesn’t come from arithmetic itself but by us explaining the 
relationship of numbers. We are doing a meta language to our formal system. 
Arithmetic 
Let us have a formula F(v) that is true for the elements of set A. Then A is arithmetic. It is the 
same as expressability in our more abstract example. So now we have this more precise 
definition 
𝐹(𝑛) ∈ 𝑇 ↔ 𝑛 ∈ 𝐴 
Then the set A is called arithmetic 
Since in this particular system we have formulas with more than one variable then we say the 




arithmetic. So, a vector is arithmetic if the relationship between numbers in the vector and the 
formula make the formula true. 
As you can see it is very similar to our definition of expressible. 
Lastly, we are going to introduce a new concept called an arithmetic function 
A function (form RN to N)  f(x1,x2,x3,4..xn) is arithmetic if the relationship 
f(x1,x2,x3,4..xn)=y is arithmetic. For this relationship to be arithmetic it means that there is a 
Formula F(v1,…vn, vn+1) that when replaced with  x1..xn1,y the formula is true. So, the 
formula is true if and only if the relationship of the function with its arriving value holds. 
In a sense what this function is telling us is that there is a way of taking a formula in our 
language and transforming it to an arithmetic relationship of a function with an arriving 
value. Since functions are arithmetic they take values and use arithmetic operators, in a sense 
we are making the formula arithmetic and we are also making arithmetic relationships into 
formulas in our language.  
Gödel numbering in our system 
We are not going to do a whole system for creating Gödel numbers for this particular system. 
But we are going to list three properties that the Gödel numbering should have  
 
1. The Gödel numbering is a process in which we assign a number to each character of 
our system and using arithmetic operators in the expression made of these characters 
we get the Gödel number of our expression from the associated number of our 
characters being transformed from arithmetic operators 
2. For any n being a natural number in our system, there is an arithmetic function f(n)=z, 
where z is the Gödel number of n. So, the Gödel number of n is represented in the 
relationship strictly depending on n. Also, since we can create an arithmetic function 




process of Gödel numbering in n it will give us the Gödel number of n that it is z.” in 
our mathematical language. This sentence that we have created is the one that 
expresses n and z 
3. For any two expressions (expressions not formulas) X and Y, with Gödel numbers x 
and y, there exists an arithmetic function f(x,y)=z such that z is the Gödel number of 
XY 
4. For any formula X with Gödel number x and for any natural number n with Gödel 
number y, there exists an arithmetic function such that r(x,y)= the Gödel number of 
X(n). This means there is a formula R(x,y,godel number of X(n)) that expresses x, y 
and the Gödel number of X(n) 
Note that in properties 2, 3 and 4 we are not saying anything about the truthfulness of the 
Formulas or expressions itself. We are saying truthfulness about the formulas that 
construct their respective Gödel numbers with the arithmetic functions we created. The 
expressions may be true or false but the Formulas that talk about the Gödel numbers that 
we have created using arithmetic properties of the Gödel numbering system are true for 
our arithmetic function relationship. 
Diagonalization 
Since we already defined an arithmetic function r(x,y)=z where x is the Gödel number of 
the formula Fx and y is the Gödel number of the natural number y and z is the Gödel 
number of Fx(y), then we just use as a diagonal function the function r(x,x)=d(x)=c where 
c is the Gödel number of diagonalization . So, we already have an arithmetic function for 
the diagonalization. This also means we have a formula expressing x and c. 
Now we are ready to prove Assumption one of a formal system that we haven’t proved 




Remember that A*=d-1(A) 
So, we can say that A is arithmetic which means there is a Formula F(y) expressing y for 
y∈A. Also, there is a formula for the arithmetic function r(x)=y∈ 𝐴 r being the 
diagonalization of x∈A*. So there are two formulas one expressing D(x,y) and the other 
one F(y). So we can construct in our language a formula saying “There exist an x∈A* 
such that D(x,y) and F(y)”. We make y constant with a value y that belongs to A and we 
have a formula that only involves x. This formula will be easy to construct and this x has 
to exist by the definition of our sets A and A* and it expresses A*. And this formula gives 
true for all values of A* when we change the constants for other y in A. So, A* is 
expressible. 
We have proven Assumption one. Note that this assumption has to do in a system that 
contains arithmetic. That is why Assumption one is associated with systems with 
sufficient arithmetic. Because we need to create this correspondence between formulas 
and arithmetic functions. 
Proof of Assumption 2 
Assumption 2 is easy to prove. If the system is consistent and A is expressible then ?̌? is 
expressible by the negation of the formula. So, if X expresses A not X expresses?̌?. 
So, all of our theorems from the abstract part have been proven for example for every 
arithmetic set A there is a Gödel sentence for A 
 
Proof that True sentences are not arithmetic. 
Since A is arithmetic so is A*. Let H(x) be a formula expressing A* and h the Gödel number 
of it. Then Since H expresses A* then H(h)  𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 ℎ ∈ 𝐴*. Then 




So, H(h) is a Gödel sentence for A 
We can apply our assumptions that are already proven to the theorems we proved in an 
abstract way and now we can arrive to the conclusion that 
The set T of Gödel numbers of true sentences is not arithmetic. 
The only missing part to have completed the proof is to proof that the set P of Gödel numbers 
of provable sentences is arithmetic 
Proving this is really technical and complicated that is why with a main idea of the process 
will be enough to understand the proof. 
Proof of Assumption 3 
To prove this assumption, we need to define the Gödel number of a sequence. Like in 
mathematics a proof is a sequence of statements and formulas that through a deductive way 
take you from point A to point B. We already know each sentence and formula composing 
the proof has a Gödel number. So, what we can do is create a Gödel number for the whole 
proof, a Gödel number for the whole sequence. Let’s say that we have 5 strings that compose 
our proof. Each one with Gödel numbers A, B, C, D, E. The we can say that the Gödel 
number of this sequence will be a multiplication of the first prime numbers each one raise to 
the power of the Gödel number according to the order of the sentence. For this example, it 
will be  
K=2A*3B*5C*7D*11E. 
Note I am doing the definition of the Gödel number of the sequence this way just to illustrate 
the idea. There are many different ways of doing them. 
This will be the Gödel number of the sequence.  
The last sentence is the one that we are mostly interested since it is a provable sentence with 




We can see that there is an arithmetic relationship between K the Gödel number of the 
sequence and E the Gödel number of the provable sentence. So, we can define a function 
f(E)=K. Then we can create a formula in our system that states this arithmetic relationship of 
K and E. Finally, we have the formula F (V1, V2) which is true for V1=K, V2=E. We can 
make a new formula where V1=K and we have our new formula F(V2) which expresses E.  
So, every provable sentence is arithmetic since we can repeat this for all provable sentences. 
We have proven our three assumptions and with that we can be sure that our proof of Gödel’s 






































Gödel’s theorems are highly controversial in the mathematical world. What to me is 
interesting is that Gödel never doubt about the truthfulness of mathematics. Gödel was a 
Platonic mathematician, he believed higher mathematical truths exist in a higher dimension 
and we try to grasp them through reason and formal systems. But these truths exist 
independent of the system. His work has been taken form a postmodern perspective in which 
they try to argue that even mathematics can’t determine what is truth and truth is only a 
perspective and not an absolute. He never got in that train. As Gödel I also believe 
mathematics as higher truths. But what it scares me is that we won’t be able to fully 
understand these truths. We may have to accept our human condition and live in the cave and 
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